"DIFFERENCE"

Feminism and feminist theories are interesting sites, in that there is no one totalizing description of feminism that is adequate; nor is there one theory, framework or methodology that is “the best”. Additionally, there is not one experience that can speak for the rest, nor should there be.

There are some that will acknowledge these ideas. There are some that will contribute their voice. There are others who may not acknowledge these ideas, and still others who will not contribute their voice. And, there are those who are struggling to be heard……this train of thought is endless….

One thing that I argue, is that: We (feminists) must acknowledge difference(s).

Additionally, I argue, that no matter one’s own position, one’s own preferred paths, to claim that one way is superior is problematic and is an attempt to silence. For example, Moya (2001) in her piece titled “Chicana Feminism and Postmodernist Theory”[i] insists that: “Only by conducting a careful examination of how, when, and under what conditions la facultad develops- using the methodology and epistemology provided by a postpositivist realist theory of identity – will we be able to understand adequately the latent epistemic privilege of the oppressed” (Moya, 2001, p. 474). I do not have a problem with her passion towards postpositivist realist practices, but I do have a problem with her suggesting that her way is the only way. What I find interesting, juxtaposed to this argument, is that throughout her piece she makes some important contributions (minus her disservice to postmodern theory through poor and unfair characterizations, and her “my way or the highway” proposals for research) to feminist theory and the ideas of difference, highlighting that race, class, and gender are all things to consider. For example, she states that “some women who now identify as women of color may have participated in gender-based political movements without fully understanding that such organizations systematically neglected the race and class interests central to the lives of most nonwhite women” (Moya, 2001, p. 475).

Moya’s attempt at highlighting the need to consider difference is better, or also, illustrated in the works of Anzaldúa[ii] , Lorde[iii], and Johnson[iv]. Johnson (1998) illustrates difference in many ways, and the ways that caught my eye were in her examples through literature, law, and legal writing and publishing. For example, in her work on legal rhetoric she states that “in real life, as feminists split and debate, the notion of woman- or feminist- is shown to have more than one meaning, to be subject of dispute in its own right” (Johnson, 1998, p. 193). And, this is ok. In fact, it is encouraged! She adds that: “Feminists have to take the risk of confronting and negotiating differences among women if we are ever to transform such differences into positive rather than negative forces in women’s lives” (Johnson, 1998, p. 194).  Finally, what we can’t do is “erase the difference” (Johnson, 1998, p. 23).

Lorde (2007) takes a similar position, in that she also acknowledges the importance of difference, and the disadvantages to not recognizing difference. For example, she states that: “Refusing to recognize difference makes it impossible to see the different problems and pitfalls facing us as women” (Lorde, 2007, p. 118). Additionally, she states: “it is not our differences which separate women, but our reluctance to recognize those differences and to deal effectively with the distortions which have resulted from ignoring and misnaming of those differences” (Lorde, 2007, p. 122).

Finally, Anzaldúa (2007), highlights difference in her piece titled “The Homeland, Aztlan/ El otro Mexico”. In this piece she does an excellent job at presenting a narrative that highlights some of the violence(s) that Anglo-American’s have enacted, and continue to enact, upon People of Color, and specifically: Indians, Chicano’s, Chicana’s, Mexicans, Tejanos, and others during the continued colonization of “American” “territory”. For example, “Those who make it past the checking points of the Border Patrol find themselves in the midst of 150 years of racism in Chicano barrios in the Southwest and in big northern cities. Living in a no-man’s boarderland, caught between being treated as criminals and being able to eat, between resistance and deportation, the illegal refugees are some of the poorest and the most exploited of any people in the U.S.” (Anzaldúa, 2007, p.48). Additionally, this piece highlights the importance of considering feminism within a transnational context. She states: “The infusion of the values of the white culture, coupled with the exploitation by that culture, is changing the Mexican way of life” (Anzaldúa, 2007, p. 47).

Although it is imperative to remember that we can’t essentialize or make totalizing claims about experiences and identities through reading the above pieces by Anzaldúa, Johnson, Lorde, or Moya; all of these pieces are important in their contribution to highlighting the importance of acknowledging difference, of hearing difference, of not being afraid of difference, and considering one’s own difference(s). I argue that this is something to harp on, especially for White feminists who may still cling to notions of being color blind, or class blind, and/or to those who are positions of power but who will not acknowledge their power, the impact of their power, or their difference(s). Overall, people’s positionality is something to be considered, as well as our own practices and reflection. According to Lorde: “The true focus of revolutionary change is never merely the oppressive situations which we seek to escape, but that piece of the oppressor which is planted deep within each of us, and which knows only the oppressors’ tactics, the oppressors’ relationships” (p. 123).  

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[i] Moya, P. M. L. (2001). Chicana feminism and postmodernist theory, pp. 463-481. Found in McCann, C. R., & Kim, S-k. (Eds). (2010). Feminist Theory Reader: Local and Global Perspectives 2nd Ed. New York, NY: Routledge.

[ii] Anzaldúa, G. (2007). The Homeland, Azatlan/ El otro Mexico, pp. 44-49. From The Transnational Studies Reader: Intersections and Innovations (Eds. Sanjeev Khagram & Peggy Levitt). NY: Routledge.

[iii] Lourde, A. (2007). “Age, Race, Class, and Sex:  Women Redefining Difference”. pp. 114-123. Sister Outsider: Essays & Speeches. Berkeley, CA: Crossing Press

[iv] Johnson, B. (1998). The Feminist Difference. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
    Ch 1- Is Female to Male as Ground is to Figure? p. 17-36.
    Ch 9- The Alchemy of Style and Law. pp. 165-187.
    Ch 10. The Postmodern in Feminism: A Response to Mary Joe Frug. pp. 183-194.

"WOMAN"

“WOMAN”

The issue of “woman” in feminist theory has at times shown to be problematic  for a variety of reasons. In Alcoff’s (2006) piece titled “The Crisis in Feminist Theory”[i] she engages in, and arguably constructs, a debate between cultural feminism and poststructuralism and posits that both have their strengths and weaknesses in their contribution to feminist theory- but that “to avoid the problems with cultural feminism and postructuralism, feminism needs to develop a third course, an alternative theory of the subject that is neither essentialist [a disadvantage of cultural feminism] nor nominalist [a disadvantage of poststructuralism]” (Alcoff, 2006, p. 144). Alcoff’s (2006) alternative is positionality, which she states has two points.

“First….the concept of woman is a relational term identifiable only within a (constantly moving) context; but second, that the position that women find themselves in can be actively utilized (rather than transcended) as a location for the construction of meaning, a place from where meaning can be discovered (the meaning of being female). The concept of woman as positionality shows how women use their positional perspective as a place from which values are interpreted and constructed rather than as a locus of an already determined set of values” (p. 148).

I find her discussion of the limits of cultural feminism and poststructural feminism to be important moments of feminist practice where she acknowledges their strengths and weaknesses to the feminist project(s) and feminist theory itself; as well as her reconciliation with positionality being something that can advance the feminist project(s) and theory. However, and this may be a bit presumptuous to suggest- but, I think Alcoff under-appreciates how poststructuralism encompasses positionality, and in fact I argue that she limits poststructuralism unfairly.  

 First, she suggests that poststructuralism threatens to “wipe out feminism itself” (p. 142) because it “threatens to deconstruct the feminist subject as well as the female subject” (p. 142); however, this is based on her idea that the poststructuralists concept of women is within nominalism: “the idea that the category “woman” is a fiction without objective basis and that feminist efforts must be directed toward dismantling this fiction” (p. 140-1). I believe that this interpretation of poststructuralism is flawed. Although, it may be correct to say that poststructuralism would have a problem with the idea of “objectivtivity”, Alcoff’s interpretation of poststructuralism assumes that in the process of deconstruction bodies are completely striped of their positionality and markings thus creating homogenous identities, or individuals whose “intentions [are] constructed within a social reality” (p. 140), additionally assuming that this process presents “a total erasure of individual agency….[and] totalization of history’s imprint” (p. 140). What becomes problematic about this interpretation of poststructuralism is that it doesn’t acknowledge, for example, Foucault’s interests in investigating and deconstructing capillary moments of power, and suggests that in this process the individual must be stripped of agency and is reducible to a material position that lacks markings, such as race, gender, and class (for example). However, how could this be? What would the project of deconstructing moments of capillary power look like without discussions of agency, identity, being marked, and positionality? Additionally, Alcoff’s position proposes that examining persons within social realities is linked to deconstructing them to persons without any agency. And, although she cites some “poststructuralists” to defend her points, it is important to note that those who she uses to defend her points are arguably not always “in sync” with each other. For example, she posits that poststructuralists, like Foucault and Derrida suggest a negative feminism, like Kristeva, who states that “a feminist practice can only be negative, at odds with what already exists” (p. 141); however, to fix Foucault within this interpretation of advocating for a negative feminism, is itself inherently problematic because, he is arguably more interested in moments of capillary power, which may not always lend itself to a negative feminism. 

Finally, Alcoff suggests that “for the poststructuralist, race, class, and gender are all constructs and therefore incapable of decisively validating conceptions of justice and truth because underneath there is nothing- hence once again underneath we are all the same” (p. 143). A close reading of this argument highlights how Alcoff doesn’t acknowledge that positionality is part of, or at least can be part of, poststructuralism. How can we all be the same? This would suggest some larger structure where we all are clones of one another, with no position, no markings, and no power. However, Foucault is clear in his projects which trace geneology and power, in its most capillary moments. To suggest, that there would be moments without power, even in its most capillary sites, that in fact there are moments beyond the capillary moments of power- is to remove power, and this project is far from Foucault. I posit that what has been provided by Alcoff, at times, is a problematic interpretation of poststructuralism, and continues the disservices ascribed to poststructuralism (which I frequently find in scholarship that underappreciates and/or misinterprets it). Instead, I propose that poststructuralism can, at its very core, acknowledge positionality and investigate its capillary moments of power. 

            With that said, Alcoff does, however, offer important insights into cultural and poststructuralist feminisms which are present in the writings of the Combahee River Collective[ii], Luce Irigaray[iii], Monique Wittig[iv], and Helene Cixous[v]. Alcoff argues that “the problem with the cultural feminist response to sexism is that it does not criticize the fundamental mechanism of sexism and in fact reinvokes that mechanism in its supposed solution…on this view, essentialist formulations of womanhood, even when made by feminists, “tie: the individual to her identity as a woman and thus cannot represent a solution to sexism”” (Alcoff, 2006, p. 139). Irigaray illustrates this well in her piece in which she reduces women to her sex, and ultimately her body parts. For example, Irigaray (1977) links sex to women, and biology to women, when she posits that “a woman “touches herself” constantly without anyone being able to forbid her to do so, for her sex is composed of two lips which embrace continually. Thus, within herself she is already two-but not divisible into ones-who stimulate each other” (p. 385).  In this excerpt, to be a woman means to posses two lips, resulting in women being tied to their biological anatomy. Cixous (1976) also links the body to the woman, and goes even further to suggest that femininity is directly linked to women, and their bodies, because it is women who are feminine, it is seemingly in their nature (p. 885). 

            Although these authors (Irigaray & Cixous) do risk falling into the disadvantages proposed by Alcoff, that such feminist practices reinscribe themselves within sexism and its mechanisms, these authors and their works are still important contributions to feminism, theory, and its project(s). Because, even though there are risks and disadvantages to such proposals, they are still voices trying to be heard, voices that challenge, and they give other authors, feminists, and scholars something to consider, and potentially even something that may inspire them to write something of their own. 

A particular piece to consider, as a challenge to Alcoff’s constructed debate between cultural feminism and poststructuralism, and her alternative “positionality”, is that by the Combahee River Collective. For example, Alcoff suggests that “the feminist theory written by women of color tends to resist the universalizing tendency of cultural feminism” (p. 138); however, the Combahee River Collective, even though they claim to resist biological determinism, seem to still position themselves within and against certain race and sex categories that historically position themselves within a sort of biological determinism. With that said, the Combahee River Collective also embraces positionality, in that they position themselves “as black women”, and offer critical and important insights for feminist practices and theories. Alcoff suggests that “the concept of positionality allows for a determinate though fluid identity of woman that does not fall into essentialism: woman is a position which a feminist politics can emerge” (p. 149). And it is within this piece (The Combahee River Collective) that a feminist politics emerges; additionally, it is within this piece (juxtaposing it to Alcoff’s piece) and that we see tensions when we try and pit some frameworks of feminism against one another. 

Returning to Cixous’ work, it is important to note how her writing is similar to the Combahee River Collective piece in that Cixous uses positionality. She positions herself as a woman, and more specifically a black woman, in order to offer critical insights, as well as to make calls to other women. For example her piece opens with:

“Woman must write her self: must write about women and bring women to writing, from which they have been driven away as violently as from their bodies- for the same reasons, by the same law, with the same fatal goal. Women must put herself into the text- as into the world and into history- by her own movement” (Cixous, 1976, p. 875).

However, as noted above, Cixous also falls into cultural and radical feminist territory because she attaches the woman, and femininity to the woman’s body, reinscribing biology to the notion of woman, and tying femininity to the woman’s body. 

In addition, Wittig, is an example of the “type” of poststructuralism most discussed by Alcoff. For example, Wittig argues that we must “kill the myth of “woman” including its most seductive aspects” (p. 247). In her work she argues that women are a myth and that we must “fight for women as a class and for the disappearance of this class” (p. 246). This is an example of what Alcoff would suggest is poststructuralist, because it arguably aims to remove marks on the body, such as sex and gender. 

Although Wittig provides some unique insights into the social construction of woman, women, and other identities, she falls into the line of thinking which she is trying to escape. For example, she claims that “our fight aims to suppress men as a class, not through a genocidal, but a political struggle” (p. 247). And in this mission to suppress men as a class, she is still situating men as a class, in tension with women, and each woman: Pitting sex against sex, biology against biology, and attaching the sex to the material body; something which she works hard throughout her piece no to do and to reject. Additionally, she is advocating a particular power, instead of deconstructing power relationships; thus she is arguably risking reinscribing power and oppression from one to another. In this act it could be suggested that she has internalized oppression by the dominant and is now performing that oppression onto others.

Overall, Alcoff’s piece is an important contribution to feminist theory because it helps to think about feminism, feminist theories, and the feminist project(s). However, we can’t use Alcoff’s piece to degrade other feminist works that may fall into cultural, radical, or poststructuralist frameworks. If we did, we would risk silencing feminist scholars, we would be saying that they were wrong, that they must “progress” to something other than what they are and what their voice wanted to say. An important reminder that I would like to put out there, after having read this particular collection of works is that, as feminists we must embrace feminist voices, and hear what they have to say. Of course, it seems as though we may at times have things to add, or contest to; regardless, we must never forget that there is not one woman, one voice, or one feminism. Additionally, we must heed what Fausto-Sterling illustrates in her work [vi] , which is that -it is important to problematize gender, sex, social constructions, and science.  And, finally, we must heed to the concerns of voices that work to fix themselves within particular times and spaces, because if they are choosing to fix themselves- I suggest that maybe it is for good reason, that they must have something they want to say, therefore, we should listen.

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[i] Alcoff, L. M. (2006). Visible Identities, Race, Gender, and the Self. NY: Oxford university Press.

[ii] The Combahee River Collective. A black feminist statement, pp. 106-112. From McCann, C. R., & Kim, S. K. (Eds). (2010). Feminist Theory Reader: Local and Global Perspectives 2^nd Ed. New York, NY: Routledge.

[iii] Luce Irigaray. This sex which is not one, pp. 384-388. From McCann, C. R., & Kim, S. K. (Eds). (2010). Feminist Theory Reader: Local and Global Perspectives 2^nd Ed. New York, NY: Routledge.

[iv] Monique Wittig. One is not born a woman, pp. 244-249. From McCann, C. R., & Kim, S. K. (Eds). (2010). Feminist Theory Reader: Local and Global Perspectives 2^nd Ed. New York, NY: Routledge.

[v] Cixous, H. (1976). The laugh of the Medusa. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society (Trans. Keith Cohen & Paula Cohen), 1(4). Pp. 875-893.

[vi] Fausto-Sterling, A. (2000). Sexing the Body: Gender Politics and the Construction of Sexuality. NY: Basic Books.