Postmodernism & Desconstruction

There are many criticisms, misunderstandings, and misrepresentations of ‘deconstruction’ out there, as well as postmodern and poststructuralist. To those critics, I first ask you to read some quotes from Butler[i].

                                           

“I don’t know what postmodern is, but I do have some sense of what it might mean to subject notions of the body and materiality to a deconstructive critique. To deconstruct the concept of matter or that of bodies is not to negate or refuse either term. To deconstruct these terms means, rather to continue to use them, to repeat them, to repeat them subversively, and to displace them from the context in which they have been deployed as instruments of oppressive power” (Butler, p. 17).  Additionally, “to take the construction of the subject as a political problematic is not the same as doing away with the subject; to deconstruct the subject is not to negate or throw away the concept; on the contrary, deconstruction implies only that we suspend all commitments to that to which the term, “the subject”, refers, and that we consider the linguistic functions it serves in the consolidation and concealment of authority. To deconstruct is not to negate or to dismiss, but to call into question and, perhaps most importantly, to open up a term, like the subject, to a reusage or redeployment that previously has not been authorized” (Butler, p. 15).

Additionally, when trying to understand postmodernism Haraway[ii] (1991) reminds us that “the production of universal, totalizing theory is a major mistake that misses most of reality, probably always, but certainly now” (p. 182). Thus, when universalizing and totalizing remarks are made about postmodernism, I argue one should be skeptical.

Haraway, in the “Cyborg Manifesto” suggests that ”cyborg imagery can suggest a way out of the maze of dualisms in which we have explained our bodies and our tools to ourselves. This is a dream not of a common language, but of a powerful infidel of heteroglossia. It is an imagination of a feminist speaking in tongues …it means both building and destroying machines, identities, categories, relationships, space stories” (p. 181). Additionally, she ads “the feminist dream of a common language, like all dreams for a perfectly true language, of perfectly faithful naming of experience, is a totalizing and imperialist one” (Haraway, p. 173).  Thus, “there is not even such a state as ‘being’ female, itself a highly complex category constructed in contested sexual scientific discourses and other social practices. Gender, race, or class consciousness is an achievement forced on us by the terrible historica experience of the contradictory social realities of patriarchy, colonialism, and capitalism” (Haraway, p. 155). 

          Grewal & Kaplan (2006)[iii] add to the conversation about totalization in their critique of “global feminism”, which they argue “has stood for a kind of Western cultural imperialism. The term “global feminism” has elided the diversity of women’s agency in favor of a universalized Western model of women’s liberation that celebrates individuality and modernity” (p. 17). They add, “universalizing, anti-poststructuralist, anti-postmodernist movements toward an albeit nonessentialist but universal category called woman allows state power and the power of fundamentalist groups to mobilize forces against all female persons” (p. 28). Finally, they also suggest that there are misrepresentations and practices of postmodernism which “see postmodernism as a movement toward ambivalence, the decentered subject, and so on, rather than as a thorough critique of modernity and its related institutions” (Grewal & Kaplan, p. 21).

       Thus, postmodernist work and those that deconstruct arguably are not in the practice of nihilism, rather this work is typically dedicated to deconstructing, networking, and pealing back layers in order to interrogate power, markings, and discourses that shape, construct, and influence.

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[i] Judith Butler, “Contingent Foundations: Feminism and the question of “postmodernism””. pp. 3-21. Retrieved from http://cleandraws.com/butler_contingentfoundations.pdf

[ii] Donna Haraway, (1991). A cyborg manifesto: Science, technology, and socialist-feminism in the late twentieth century. Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature. NY: Routledge. Retrieved from http://www.stanford.edu/dept/HPS/Haraway/CyborgManifesto.html

[iii] Grewal, I. & Kaplan, C. (Eds). (2006). Ch 1 Introduction: Transnational Feminist practices and Questions of Postmodernity. pp. 1-36.  From Scattered Hegemonies.

Sexualities

According to Rubin (1984)[i], we must work towards a radical theory of the politics of sexuality:  “Gender affects the operation of the sexual system, and the sexual system has had gender-specific manifestations. But although sex and gender are related, they are not the same thing, and they form the basis of two distinct arenas of social practice….I am now arguing that it is essential to separate gender and sexuality analytically to reflect more accurately their separate social existence” (p. 170). Additionally, Rubin (1984) notes that “feminism is the theory of gender oppression. To assume automatically that this makes it the theory of sexual oppression is to fail to distinguish between gender, on the one hand, and erotic desire on the other” (p. 169).

Correa and Petchesky (1994)[ii] arguably offer a feminism that acknowledges gender as well as sexuality in their work on reproductive and sexual rights. “We define the terrain of reproductive and sexual rights in terms of power and resources: power to make informed decisions about one’s own fertility, childbearing, child rearing, gynecologic health, and sexual activity; and resources to carry out such decisions safely and effectively”(p. 119). Thus, they argue that “anchoring the possibility of women’s individual right to health, well-being, and “self-determined sexual lives” to the social changes necessary to eliminate poverty and empower women, this framework dissolves the boundary between sexuality, human rights, and development” (p. 121).

Hammonds (1999)[iii] argues that Black women have remained largely unanalyzed and undertheorized in the debates about sexuality (p. 93). Hammonds posits that “Black lesbian sexualities are not  simply identities. Rather they represent discursive and material terrains where there exists the possibility for the active production of speech, desire, and agency. Black lesbians theorizing sexuality is a site that disrupts silence and imagines a positive affirming sexuality. I am arguing for a different level of engagement between black heterosexual and black lesbian women as the basis for the development of a black feminist praxis that articulates the ways in which invisibility, otherness, stigma, are produced and reproduced on black women’s bodies. And ultimately my hope is that such an engagement will produce black feminist analyses which detail strategies for differently located black women to shape interventions that embody their separate and common interests and perspectives” (p. 102). 

What is important to note about each of these pieces, is first that gender is not synonymous with sexuality. Next, we can see how different scholars may approach the study of gender and sexuality differently. Additionally, it is important to consider differences regarding people’s sexuality and gender with critical insights as an attempt to prevent the reproduction of dominant, and oppressive, ideas and ideologies. Also, although I believe that Rubin is correct in her desire at the time to create a radical politics of sexuality that acknowledges the differences between sexuality and gender and not to incorrectly use gender theories as sexual theories, I also suggest that both Hammonds as well as Correa and Petchesky show us how we can study sexuality and gender together. Finally, all of these scholars, in their work acknowledge additional, and necessary, things to consider in regards to sexuality and gender, which are constructs, such as: race, class, age, and other relevant positionalities and social markings

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[i] Rubin, G. (1984). Thinking sex: Notes for a radical theory of the politics of sexuality. Pleasure and Dance: Exploring Female Sexuality (Carol S. Vance ED). Routledge. Retrieved from http://library.northsouth.edu/Upload/Culture.pdf#page=142

[ii] Correa, S. & Petchesky, R. (1994). Reproductive and sexual rights: A feminist perspective. From McCann, C. R., & Kim, S-k. (Eds). (2010). Feminist Theory Reader: Local and Global Perspectives 2nd Ed. New York, NY: Routledge.

[iii] Hammonds, E. M. (1999). “Toward a Genealogy of Black Female Sexuality:  The Problematic of Silence”. From Feminist Theory and the Body: A Reader (Eds Janet Price & Margrit Shildrick). (1999). NY: Routledge.

"DIFFERENCE"

Feminism and feminist theories are interesting sites, in that there is no one totalizing description of feminism that is adequate; nor is there one theory, framework or methodology that is “the best”. Additionally, there is not one experience that can speak for the rest, nor should there be.

There are some that will acknowledge these ideas. There are some that will contribute their voice. There are others who may not acknowledge these ideas, and still others who will not contribute their voice. And, there are those who are struggling to be heard……this train of thought is endless….

One thing that I argue, is that: We (feminists) must acknowledge difference(s).

Additionally, I argue, that no matter one’s own position, one’s own preferred paths, to claim that one way is superior is problematic and is an attempt to silence. For example, Moya (2001) in her piece titled “Chicana Feminism and Postmodernist Theory”[i] insists that: “Only by conducting a careful examination of how, when, and under what conditions la facultad develops- using the methodology and epistemology provided by a postpositivist realist theory of identity – will we be able to understand adequately the latent epistemic privilege of the oppressed” (Moya, 2001, p. 474). I do not have a problem with her passion towards postpositivist realist practices, but I do have a problem with her suggesting that her way is the only way. What I find interesting, juxtaposed to this argument, is that throughout her piece she makes some important contributions (minus her disservice to postmodern theory through poor and unfair characterizations, and her “my way or the highway” proposals for research) to feminist theory and the ideas of difference, highlighting that race, class, and gender are all things to consider. For example, she states that “some women who now identify as women of color may have participated in gender-based political movements without fully understanding that such organizations systematically neglected the race and class interests central to the lives of most nonwhite women” (Moya, 2001, p. 475).

Moya’s attempt at highlighting the need to consider difference is better, or also, illustrated in the works of Anzaldúa[ii] , Lorde[iii], and Johnson[iv]. Johnson (1998) illustrates difference in many ways, and the ways that caught my eye were in her examples through literature, law, and legal writing and publishing. For example, in her work on legal rhetoric she states that “in real life, as feminists split and debate, the notion of woman- or feminist- is shown to have more than one meaning, to be subject of dispute in its own right” (Johnson, 1998, p. 193). And, this is ok. In fact, it is encouraged! She adds that: “Feminists have to take the risk of confronting and negotiating differences among women if we are ever to transform such differences into positive rather than negative forces in women’s lives” (Johnson, 1998, p. 194).  Finally, what we can’t do is “erase the difference” (Johnson, 1998, p. 23).

Lorde (2007) takes a similar position, in that she also acknowledges the importance of difference, and the disadvantages to not recognizing difference. For example, she states that: “Refusing to recognize difference makes it impossible to see the different problems and pitfalls facing us as women” (Lorde, 2007, p. 118). Additionally, she states: “it is not our differences which separate women, but our reluctance to recognize those differences and to deal effectively with the distortions which have resulted from ignoring and misnaming of those differences” (Lorde, 2007, p. 122).

Finally, Anzaldúa (2007), highlights difference in her piece titled “The Homeland, Aztlan/ El otro Mexico”. In this piece she does an excellent job at presenting a narrative that highlights some of the violence(s) that Anglo-American’s have enacted, and continue to enact, upon People of Color, and specifically: Indians, Chicano’s, Chicana’s, Mexicans, Tejanos, and others during the continued colonization of “American” “territory”. For example, “Those who make it past the checking points of the Border Patrol find themselves in the midst of 150 years of racism in Chicano barrios in the Southwest and in big northern cities. Living in a no-man’s boarderland, caught between being treated as criminals and being able to eat, between resistance and deportation, the illegal refugees are some of the poorest and the most exploited of any people in the U.S.” (Anzaldúa, 2007, p.48). Additionally, this piece highlights the importance of considering feminism within a transnational context. She states: “The infusion of the values of the white culture, coupled with the exploitation by that culture, is changing the Mexican way of life” (Anzaldúa, 2007, p. 47).

Although it is imperative to remember that we can’t essentialize or make totalizing claims about experiences and identities through reading the above pieces by Anzaldúa, Johnson, Lorde, or Moya; all of these pieces are important in their contribution to highlighting the importance of acknowledging difference, of hearing difference, of not being afraid of difference, and considering one’s own difference(s). I argue that this is something to harp on, especially for White feminists who may still cling to notions of being color blind, or class blind, and/or to those who are positions of power but who will not acknowledge their power, the impact of their power, or their difference(s). Overall, people’s positionality is something to be considered, as well as our own practices and reflection. According to Lorde: “The true focus of revolutionary change is never merely the oppressive situations which we seek to escape, but that piece of the oppressor which is planted deep within each of us, and which knows only the oppressors’ tactics, the oppressors’ relationships” (p. 123).  

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[i] Moya, P. M. L. (2001). Chicana feminism and postmodernist theory, pp. 463-481. Found in McCann, C. R., & Kim, S-k. (Eds). (2010). Feminist Theory Reader: Local and Global Perspectives 2nd Ed. New York, NY: Routledge.

[ii] Anzaldúa, G. (2007). The Homeland, Azatlan/ El otro Mexico, pp. 44-49. From The Transnational Studies Reader: Intersections and Innovations (Eds. Sanjeev Khagram & Peggy Levitt). NY: Routledge.

[iii] Lourde, A. (2007). “Age, Race, Class, and Sex:  Women Redefining Difference”. pp. 114-123. Sister Outsider: Essays & Speeches. Berkeley, CA: Crossing Press

[iv] Johnson, B. (1998). The Feminist Difference. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
    Ch 1- Is Female to Male as Ground is to Figure? p. 17-36.
    Ch 9- The Alchemy of Style and Law. pp. 165-187.
    Ch 10. The Postmodern in Feminism: A Response to Mary Joe Frug. pp. 183-194.

Biology, Sex, Gender & Anne Fausto-Sterling

When asking questions about gender and sex Anne Fausto-Sterling offers us a few reminders and calls. First, in her piece titled “The Bare Bones of Sex: Part 1- Sex and Gender” (2005)[i] she investigates the study of bones and tells us that “the sex-gender or nature nurture accounts of difference fail to appreciate the degree to which culture is a partner in producing body systems commonly referred to as biology- something apart from the social” (Fausto-Sterling, 2005, p. 1516). Second, that: “We need to ask old questions in new ways so that we can think systematically about the interweaving of bodies and culture” (Fausto-Sterling, 2005, p. 1517). These claims include culture(s) as something to consider in the study of bodies, as well as sex and gender, which is a development in her work and something to consider. 

In an earlier work by Fausto-Sterling[ii] she also suggested that we study the body, and sex and gender, beyond just biology- however, in this piece she has yet to emphasize culture.  Additionally, this piece was not focused on bones, but like the first it was also intensely focused on how we understand sex and gender, including their embodiment. She concluded from this piece that “successful investigations of the process of gender embodiment must use three basic principles. First, nature/nurture is indivisible. Second, organisms- human and otherwise- are active processes, moving targets, from fertilization until death. Third, no single academic or clinical discipline provides us with the true or best way to understand human sexuality” (Fausto-Sterling, 2000, p. 235). 

Ultimately, beyond the three above mentioned principles, she argued that “I want us never, in the process, to lose sight of the fact that our debates about the body’s biology are always simultaneously moral, ethical, and political debates about social and political equality and the possibilities for change. Nothing less is at stake” (Fausto-Sterling, 2000, p. 255). 

Overall, her works suggest a development systems approach to the study of, and those that include, sex and gender, which denies that there are two processes, ie: nature and nurture; and instead suggests that we can learn more about sex and gender by considering development (and dynamic) systems. For example, she suggests “development within a social system is the sine qua non of human sexual complexity. Form and behavior emerge only via a dynamic system of development. Our psyches connect the outside to the inside (and visa versa) because our multi-year development occurs integrated within a social system” (Fausto-Sterling, 2000, p. 243). 

Finally, these works by Fausto-Sterling (2000 & 2005) are important contributions to feminist inquiry, theory, and practice. Her works acknowledges biology, as well as social constructionism, but posit that we can’t isolate the study of gender and sex within just one of these areas and to do so would be problematic because (to simplify, at the risk of oversimplification) it would either be biologically deterministic or would ignore the role that biology plays in sex and gender. Additionally, both her works offer examples of development systems theory in practice as she applies it to the study of sex and gender (2000), and the study of bones (2005). I propose that these scholarly examples can offer future researchers ways to think about their own research.

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[i] Fausto-Sterling, A. (2005). The bare bones of sex: Part 1- sex and gender.  Signs: Journal of Women in  Culture and Society, 30(2). Pp. 1491-1527.

[ii] Fausto-Sterling, A. (2000). Sexing the Body: Gender Politics and the Construction of Sexuality. NY: Basic Books.